Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Bertrand Russell on Proper Names - Dictionary of Arguments
Russell: logical proper names: this: identity without empirical investigation, therefore the only correct name. >Acquaintance. Geach I 28ff Name/Frege/Russell: refers to the bearer. - - - Russell VI 11 Names/Russell: proper names are abbreviated descriptions, but both do not play the role of singular terms. >Description, >Singular term. VI 12 Name/FregeVs Russell: is a singular term. - - - VII 346 Names/Russell/Frege/Wittgenstein: Meaning: most of all we are talking about our ideas and knowledge of the carrier. - - - Newen I 90 Names/proper names/Russell: names are nothing but abbreviations for descriptions. - - - VI 70~ Names/Russell: not just words for particulars: E.g. Socrates is a description for us! - Names do not appear in Principia Mathematica(1), only general objects are interesting there. - Acquaintance brings full information, no more possible. VI 80 Russell: names can be abbreviated descriptions: E.g. The man who did this and that = Socrates - but vice versa. Certain descriptions are not names: otherwise tautology: Scott = Scott -> Descriptions/Quine: names are hidden descriptions. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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> Counter arguments against Russell
> Counter arguments in relation to Proper Names
